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STATEMENT OF INTEREST1
The first question herein is whether the federal courts may
1

Amici state that no party or its counsel has authored this brief in
whole or in part, nor has any person or entity other than amici
and their counsel made any monetary contribution to its
preparation. Letters of consent by the parties to the filing of this
Brief have been lodged with the Clerk of this Court. Sup. Ct. R.
37.6.

review Respondent’s statutory retroactivity claim on habeas
corpus. Amici curiae are professors of legal history at law schools
and universities in the United States and England with expertise in
English legal history prior to 1789 and/or early American legal
history. The professional interest of amici curiae legal historians
is in ensuring that the Court is fully and accurately informed
respecting the historical precedent, understandings and evidence
regarding the scope and availability of the writ of habeas corpus
that, under this Court’s precedents, are properly considered in
evaluating the issues raised under the Suspension Clause. U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2. The people whose lives and writings amici
curiae study, including the generation which drafted this country’s
Constitution, considered habeas corpus a great bulwark of
personal freedom, and unquestionably the Framers, educated in
English law, drew on their common law comprehension when they
prohibited suspension of the writ. Amici curiae have no personal,
financial, or other professional interest, and take no position,
respecting the other issues raised in the case at bar.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondent Enrico St. Cyr asserts that he is in custody and
subject to deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”) based on the agency’s misinterpretation of its
organic statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§
1101 et. seq. Mr. St. Cyr contends that Congress, in amending the
immigration statutes in 1996 to eliminate certain forms of
discretionary relief from deportation, did not intend the
amendments retroactively to render him ineligible for relief based
on conduct or convictions that predated the 1996 laws. The
administrative courts rejected Mr. St. Cyr’s statutory interpretation
and refused to consider his application for relief. In his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, Mr. St. Cyr asked that a U.S. district court
judge adjudicate his statutory retroactivity claim and determine the
lawfulness of his custody by the Executive branch.
The INS responds that no judge may consider Mr. St.
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Cyr’s statutory claim, on habeas petition or otherwise. In her
opening brief, the Acting Solicitor General argues that the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”) requires, and the Constitution permits, the conclusion
that no court can review the agency interpretation of the relevant
provision, even if, as Mr. St. Cyr claims, that interpretation is
incorrect and therefore results in Respondent’s unlawful detention
and deportation.
The Acting Solicitor General maintains that this
conclusion is consistent with the Suspension Clause because “nonconstitutional” claims such Mr. St. Cyr’s statutory retroactivity
claim are “well removed” from the “core of the Great Writ.”
(Brief for Petitioner at 27, 28.) The government in its brief
reviews late nineteenth century and early twentieth century
challenges to deportation orders and discerns “four kinds of
challenges” that are concededly subject to judicial review: (1)
where the person detained was a citizen, not an alien; (2) for an
alien deprived of a “fundamentally fair administrative proceeding”;
(3) where the factual finding of deportability was “completely
without supporting evidence”; and (4) where the case did not fall
within any statutory category for deportation. Id. at 30.
The historical evidence set forth below shows, however,
that whenever a deprivation of liberty was predicated upon
determination of a question of law, that determination was
reviewable on habeas. Amici curiae are unaware of evidence that
either the English common law or early American habeas practice
recognized the sort of parsing of legal claims urged by the
government here. Rather, the historical evidence indicates that the
statutory interpretation claim raised by Respondent falls within the
scope of habeas corpus at common law.
1.
The writ of habeas corpus was available to
persons subject to civil detention in a wide range of contexts in
England prior to 1789. The INS may be analogized to eighteenth
century executive agencies such as the British Navy,
administrative bodies such as the Sewer Commissioners, or courts
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of “inferior” (limited) jurisdiction. As both case law and
commentaries confirm, unlawful detention by any such bodies
could be corrected upon issuance of habeas corpus. The Great
Writ was available to non-enemy aliens and citizens alike. Habeas
was commonly granted where a detention was grounded on an
error of law, including an error of statutory interpretation. Habeas
was never fettered by any requirement that the error go to the
jurisdiction of the decision-maker who decided to detain petitioner.
Moreover, any distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional errors was unknown to English law and habeas
corpus in the English courts. Legislative efforts to reform habeas
procedure in England in the late seventeenth to early nineteenth
centuries also uniformly assumed the broad availability of the writ
to correct errors of law that resulted in civil detention by the
government.
2.
Similarly, early American courts commonly
utilized habeas to resolve disputes of law, including disputes of
statutory construction, raised by petitioners detained civilly.
American common law also extended such remedies to noncitizens. Early American jurists who interpreted statutes on habeas
challenges to civil confinement included John Marshall, Joseph
Story, and Lemuel Shaw. Further, while the distinction between
constitutional and non-constitutional errors of law does have
meaning in the American historical context, it does not appear to
have ever been used to confine to constitutional errors the scope of
habeas corpus in cases of civil, Executive branch detention.
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ARGUMENT

I.
AT COMMON LAW IN ENGLAND, HABEAS CORPUS
WAS AVAILABLE GENERALLY TO REVIEW THE
LEGALITY OF CIVIL CONFINEMENT, WITHOUT
LIMITATION AS TO CITIZENSHIP OR THE NATURE
OF THE ILLEGALITY ASSERTED
Case Law and Commentaries Demonstrate the
General Availability of the Writ to Challenge
the Legality of Civil Confinement
1.

By the Eighteenth Century, Habeas
Corpus Was Established as a General
Remedy for Unlawful Detention,
Whether Civil or Criminal

The writ of habeas corpus originated as a judicial
development in the common law and Chancery courts of
England.2 It was known to the common law as early as the
fifteenth century, and was used to test the validity of
executive committals in numerous sixteenth century cases.3
2

As noted below (see infra, I.B), aspects of habeas corpus
practice, particularly in criminal cases, were affected by
seventeenth-century and later legislation. The broader common
law writ, however, lived outside statute, and had earlier origins.

3

See R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 6-8 (2d ed.
1989); ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF
PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT (2d ed. 1876) (reprint, Da
Capo Press, 1972); 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 104-25 (2d ed. 1938) (Methuen & Co., Sweet & Maxwell,
1966 reprint); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 129-38 (1st ed. 1765-1769) (facsimile
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The functions of the early writ were varied and included
relief from detention that, in modern terms, was civil in
nature. Any person contending that he or she was unlawfully
detained or confined could petition for habeas corpus. The
petition could also be filed by the legal custodian of the
person confined. The recipient of the writ (the alleged
confiner) was then required to file a return stating the legal
basis for the detention. The broad scope of habeas corpus
was widely recognized; as Chief Justice Coke observed in his
INSTITUTES, the writ extended to all detention “contra legem
terrae,” i.e., against the laws of the land, whether civil or
criminal, 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 54 (1642 ed.)
(William S. Hein Co. 1986). Blackstone described habeas
corpus as the “the bulwark of the British Constitution,” 4
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 438, and stated that the writ
was “efficacious . . . in all manner of illegal confinement,” 3
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES at 131.
2.

Eighteenth Century Courts Granted the
Writ to Review the Legality of
Detention in a Wide Range of Civil
Contexts

Habeas Corpus as a Remedy Against Impressment
Judges used habeas corpus on numerous occasions to
redress the unlawful impressment of sailors into the British
Navy. See, e.g., R. v. White, 20 Howell’s State Trials 1376,
1377 (K.B. 1746) (King’s Bench discharging a seaman upon
determining he was statutorily exempt from impressment);
Goldswain’s Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 711 (C.P. 1778) (writ used
reprint, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979).
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to challenge a sailor’s impressment); Ex parte Drydon, 101
Eng. Rep. 235, 236 (K.B. 1793) (Kenyon, C.J.) (holding the
naval recruitment statute was subject to an exception, and
therefore discharging the sailor). Habeas review of
impressment cases enabled not only review of the state’s
compliance with statutory enlistment rules but also review of
executive decisions. Ex parte Boggin, 104 Eng. Rep. 484,
484 n.(a) (K.B. 1811) (reference to Chalacombe's Case-habeas issued on behalf of impressed master of a coal vessel,
despite opposition by counsel for Admiralty on grounds that
exemptions for "seafaring men of this description" were
given only by "grace and favour," not "of right").
Habeas Corpus as a Remedy Against Civil Detention
by Executive Bodies and Inferior Courts
The Great Writ was used to review actions by inferior
courts of record, as well as commissions and tribunals which
affected the liberty of the subject. Thus, actions by the
London Court of Sessions,4 the bankruptcy commissioners,5
the College of Physicians in its malpractice jurisdiction over
doctors,6 the decisions of justices of the peace7 and of the
4

See Bushell’s Case, 69 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1016 (C.P. 1670)
(habeas corpus granted to discharge a juror who had been
committed for contempt by London Court of Sessions for voting
to acquit).

5

Hollingshead’s Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K.B. 1702) (prisoner
discharged; bankruptcy commission had failed to adhere to
statute); R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. 97, 914 (K.B. 1724 [reported
1730]), (habeas applied to a commitment by bankruptcy
commissioners).

6

Dr. Groenvelt’s Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 1038 (K.B. 1702) (holding
that statute empowering College of Physicians to fine did not
abrogate royal pardon power).
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Sewers Commission sitting as a court of record8 were all
reviewable upon the return of habeas corpus.

7

Gardener’s Case, 78 Eng. Rep. 1048 (K.B. 1600) (review of
question of whether justice of the peace properly interpreted
firearms statute).

8

Hetley v. Boyer, 79 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1613) (discharging
individual imprisoned for refusing to release a suit to challenge
taxation system used by the Commission to finance project;
holding such taxation system to be invalid).
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This inherent and wide-ranging supervisory
jurisdiction can properly be analogized to the very kind of
review sought in the present case, i.e., review by an Article
III court over the activities of Article I specialized tribunals,
the Board of Immigration Appeals and Immigration Judges.
“Under the common law definition, both immigration judges
and the BIA qualify as inferior courts because their
jurisdiction is specialized and limited. In certain respects,
immigration tribunals are like the King’s conciliar courts, the
extensive power of which the common law courts sought to
supervise through habeas corpus.” Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note:
The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the
1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2538 (1998)
(footnote omitted).
Habeas Corpus as a Remedy in Slavery Cases
The writ of habeas corpus supplied the jurisdictional
basis for the landmark emancipation case, Somerset v.
Stewart, 20 Howell’s State Trials 1, 79-82 (K.B. 1772).
There, a writ was issued to bring up the body of James
Somerset, an African slave who had been purchased by
defendant Charles Stewart in Virginia. Somerset was
confined on board a ship lying in English waters, about to
depart for Jamaica. The Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, ruled
that the only question was “whether the cause of detention
upon the return was sufficient,” and since there was no
authority under English law to force a slave out of the
country, “the black must be discharged.” James Oldham, New
Light on Mansfield and Slavery, 27 JOUR. OF BRITISH
STUDIES 45, 56-58 (1988) (quoting from the Hill
manuscript).
Habeas corpus also won a discharge in February
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1771 for another slave, Thomas Lewis, who otherwise would
have been sent off by his master to Jamaica to be sold. See
R. v. Stapylton, transcribed at 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH
LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1225-28 (1992); see also
id. at 1242 (discussion). During the Lewis case, Lord
Mansfield also noted that he had granted writs of habeas
corpus preventing the impressment of slaves in two or three
cases on the basis of affidavits of their masters. PRINCE
HOARE, MEMOIRS OF GRANVILLE SHARP 59 (1820).
Habeas Corpus as a Remedy Against Other Forms of
Non-criminal Confinement
Judges provided relief from private civil detention in
a diverse range of cases on habeas petitions. One common
type involved family disputes. In R. v. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep.
913 (K.B. 1763), a habeas writ supported by affidavits from
parents produced an inquiry into the state of their daughter,
who had been apprenticed at age fifteen to a music master,
but who had been handed over to defendant to become his
mistress. Lord Mansfield approved this use of the writ and
mentioned three other cases “of writs of habeas corpus
directed to private persons, ‘To bring up infants.’” Id. at 914.
In R. v. Turlington, 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1761), the writ
was issued to the keeper of a private “mad-house” to bring
into court a woman who had been placed in the asylum by
her husband. (The court first ordered that a medical
examination of the woman be conducted, and on receiving an
affidavit from the examining doctor that the woman appeared
perfectly sane, the writ was ordered. The woman appeared in
court, though no return to the writ was made.) See also R. v.
Lee, 83 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B. 1676) (reviewing husband’s
detention of wife, but refusing relief); Lister’s Case, 88 Eng.
Rep. 17, 17 (K.B. 1721) (reviewing detention, releasing wife
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whose husband “[took] her violently into his custody”).
3.

The Scope of Habeas Review in the
Eighteenth Century Encompassed
Questions of Law, Including Questions
of Statutory Interpretation

As Chief Justice Coke stated, habeas review was
generally available to provide relief against detention
contrary to the laws of the land. Questions of statutory
interpretation, along with questions of common law, were
properly and frequently addressed on habeas. A common
use of habeas was in connection with the bankruptcy statutes.
In R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep.914 (K.B. 1724 [reported 1730]),
for example, the bankruptcy commissioners concluded that
defendant, on his examination under oath, “had notoriously
prevaricated.” They had committed him to the Fleet Prison
without bail until they had resolved his estate or until he “be
otherwise delivered by due course of law.” Id. On a habeas
petition, the court ruled, per curiam, that the statute required
questions be put to the bankrupt in writing and that he be given
time to consider his answer, adding: “It is very dangerous to let
people depart from the words of the Act.” Id. Since the
commitment did not conform to the words of the statute, defendant
was discharged.
Common law judges in eighteenth-century England
disagreed about the extent to which the truth of facts asserted in a
return of a writ could be examined by the court in a habeas hearing
without being put before a jury. This was one of the issues debated
by Parliament on the unsuccessful 1758 habeas corpus bill and
dealt with in the 1816 Act. (See infra, pp 12-15). Because the
legal merits of Respondent’s statutory interpretation claim in the
present case can be determined on the basis of undisputed facts -in eighteenth century terms, on the face of the return -- that
difference of views is not pertinent to the case at bar.
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The common law courts were careful, however, to
preserve and examine the legal merits of a habeas petition, even if
this required procedural maneuvering to enable relevant statutory
interpretation to become reviewable. For example, in a King's
Bench impressment case in June 1777, the court considered how to
take up the merits of the habeas petitioner’s claim that he was
statutorily exempt. Lord Mansfield observed that, “this writ is an
antient and constitutional writ; it must go in its original form,
without bending to particular purposes,” but after discussion:
At last, Lord Mansfield, with great respect to the
gentlemen of the bar, proposed to them this
question, “Whether any harm could result from
this mode, if adopted, viz. For the Crown Lawyers
to return the writ of Habeas Corpus, that
Mellichip, being a liveryman serving upon the
river Thames, had been impressed into his
Majesty’s service, having no legal exemption.”
This, his Lordship said, would give the gentleman
on the other side an opportunity of suggesting, that
he had an exemption, such as the charter of the
City, constant, invariable, immemorial usage, or
whatever plea might be alleged. This being
entered on the record, might lead to a compleat
investigation of the whole matter in view. To
which proposal all parties seemed to acquiesce.
MORNING CHRONICLE, June 18, 1777, quoted in 1 MANSFIELD
MANUSCRIPTS, 78.

4.

At Common Law, the Writ of Habeas
Corpus Ran Throughout the
Sovereign's Territory and Applied to
All Persons Present Therein, Including
Aliens
The writ applied to all non-enemy aliens detained
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within the realm. Such treatment is consonant with a central
precept of English justice, that the sovereign's writs run
throughout the realm and apply to all persons physically
present therein. Thus, all aliens within the realm were treated
as entitled to its benefits, and subject to its burdens. This is
clearly demonstrated by the slave cases discussed above
(Somerset v. Stewart, R. v. Stapylton, p. 7, supra). See also
Case of The Hottentot Venus, 104 Eng. Rep. 344, 344 (K.B.
1810) (entertaining a habeas petition of a “female native of
South Africa” allegedly held in private custody); R. v.
Schiever, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1759) (reviewing, but
denying, the habeas petition of a neutral alien deemed a
prisoner of war because he was captured aboard an enemy
French privateer).
In Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608) (a seminal
case dealing with issues of citizenship and alienage -- though
not a habeas case) Chief Justice Coke explained why aliens
are equally subject to the prerogative writs, and equally
entitled to their benefits. “[W]hen an alien . . . cometh into
England, because as long as he is within England, he is
within the King's protection; therefore so long as he is here,
he oweth unto the King a local obedience or ligeance, for that
the one (as has been said) draweth the other.” Id. at 383.9
The common law of England therefore affords no
support to any suggestion that the scope of the Great Writ is
in any way conditioned by the nationality of the detainee.
Providing the critical element of physical presence was
established, habeas corpus could be sought on behalf of (and,
9

That habeas corpus had not been specifically used to review
immigration matters as of 1789 reflects the fact that England did
not by statute limit admission of aliens until 1793.
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indeed, against) any person, regardless of citizenship.
The Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century History
of Habeas Corpus Legislation in England
Reflects a General Understanding That Civil
Habeas Was Available to Review Executive
Detention at Common Law
As shown above, habeas corpus was developed by
fifteenth and sixteenth century common law courts as a
remedy against unlawful detention. Although a common law
creation, constitutional crises led to its reaffirmation in the
Petition of Right and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640.10
Subsequent legislation built on these foundations with largely
procedural reforms.

1.

10

The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679

For the full early history, see the sources cited at n.3, supra.
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By 1679, the principle that the writ was available at
common law and under the 1640 Act to challenge the legality
of detention in a wide range of contexts, civil and criminal,
was well established. But problems and controversies had
arisen, particularly in criminal cases, regarding the
appropriate procedures to be used and which specific courts
had power to grant the writ. Unlike its predecessors, the
1679 Act did not codify general principles of habeas
practice, but instead addressed specific practical issues
pertaining to the availability of the writ in cases of criminal
confinement (e.g., the availability of the writ during court
“vacation” time).
2.

The Habeas Corpus Bill of 175811

In 1758, a bill was proposed to extend the procedural
reforms of the 1679 Act to non-criminal cases. It passed the
House of Commons but eventually failed in the face of
opposition in the House of Lords. But two premises emerge
clearly from the debate surrounding the bill. First, it was not
seriously questioned that habeas corpus was already, as a
matter of common law, generally available in cases of civil
detention. Second, there was general agreement that, at least
with respect to executive detention, the scope of review on
habeas corpus in civil cases already was and clearly should
remain at least as extensive as in criminal cases, including
review of questions of law. The central issues in controversy
in 1758 were whether, given the broad scope of civil habeas
11

See generally, Barbara W. Kern, The English High Judiciary &
the Politics of the Habeas Corpus Bill of 1758, in HENDRIK
HARTOG, WILLIAM E. NELSON, & BARBARA W. KERN, (eds.)
LAW AS CULTURE & CULTURE AS LAW 147 (2000). Amici are
grateful to Ms. Kern for extending to us her research materials.
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at common law, reforms were necessary in the civil context,
whether the specific reforms proposed would render habeas
too readily available in cases of private detention, and
whether procedural steps were needed to ensure the
availability of habeas during times when the common law
courts were not sitting, i.e., during “vacation time” instead of
“term time.”12.

12

The central common law courts sat only four times a year for
about two to three weeks at a time. The dates for the terms
varied from year to year according to the calculation of religious
holidays, see generally C.R. CHENEY (ed.), HANDBOOK OF
DATES FOR STUDENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY (1978), but
customarily the year began in November with Michaelmas Term
(after the “long vacation”), followed by Hilary
(January/February), Easter (April/May) and Trinity (June/July).
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The bill captured public attention, as shown by “An
Account of the Origin and Use of the Writ of HABEAS
CORPUS, and of the Bill now in Parliament concerning it,”
printed in several London newspapers in late May 1758 (e.g.
Lloyd’s Evening Post, The London Chronicle, Payne’s
Universal Chronicle), when the bill had passed the Commons
and was before the House of Lords. The bill was reportedly
prompted by a recent impressment act, specifically by
reported abuses of impressment officers in disregarding
statutory exemptions. The absurdity of saying that habeas
corpus was available to those accused of crime but not
available to those unsuspected of any crime was remarked in
the newspapers, but was said to be a “doubt . . . raised by
some Lawyer.” Yet there was, in fact, no serious question
that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 did not apply to men
confined under impressment acts (who had been accused of
no crime), but rather that their remedy lay with the writ of
habeas corpus at common law.
The purpose of the 1758 bill was, thus, not to secure
the availability of habeas in civil cases; civil habeas had long
been firmly established. Rather, the bill had been put
forward by Charles Pratt, M.P., later Lord Chancellor
Camden, in response to the plight of an unnamed gentleman
who had been improperly impressed (since, as a
gentleman/property holder, he was exempt by statute from
impressment), but for whom, for procedural reasons, habeas
corpus had not been effective. As detailed above, habeas
petitions were available to challenge the impressment of
persons who were statutorily exempt (supra, p. 5), but
habeas procedures in civil cases were at times insufficiently
expeditious to prevent a falsely impressed man languishing in
prison for some time pending judicial action, or, in some
cases, from being enlisted and transported from the
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jurisdiction before the writ became returnable.13

13

These procedural difficulties were discussed in the newspapers
of the day. See, e.g., LONDON CHRONICLE, March 18-21, 1758;
LONDON EVENING POST, April 28 - May 2, 1758.
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Pratt’s bill swept through the House of Commons
with barely a murmur. It was highly popular, and its eventual
defeat in the Lords met with indignant public reaction, one
commentator calling it a blow to one of the two fundamentals
of English liberty (the other fundamental being trial by
jury).14 The opposition in the Lords was led by Lords
Mansfield (recently-appointed Chief Justice of the Court of
King’s Bench) and Hardwicke (recently resigned as Lord
Chancellor after nearly twenty years in that office). In their
deliberations, the Lords resolved to put ten questions to the
twelve common law judges in order to better understand the
need for, and the implications of, the bill. Answers given by
nine of the twelve judges are printed in Parliamentary
History; the views of the other three, including Mansfield,
can be reconstructed from other sources.15 It is not necessary
here to recount all of the difficulties that Mansfield,
Hardwicke and others had with the bill, except to note one
concern--that the bill would make it harder to obtain the writ
in some civil matters, particularly family disputes, than had
been true in practice.16
14

See, e.g., THE MONITOR OR BRITISH FREEHOLDER, July 1, 1758
(“Every friend of liberty must shudder”; “usurpation upon the
rights and liberty of the people”; “without [the bill] the personal
liberty of the subject may be left to the discretion of a
passionate, corrupt, or indiscreet judge”).

15

Sir Michael Foster and Thomas Parker (Chief Baron of the Court
of Exchequer) corresponded with Chief Justice Wilmot of the
Common Pleas, as reproduced in M. DODSON, THE LIFE OF SIR
MICHAEL FOSTER, KNT. (1811). Mansfield’s answers were
never printed, but his notes on the questions and about the bill
generally are among surviving manuscripts at the family home in
Perthshire, Scone Palace.

16

This would have been due to, among other things, the
requirement in the bill that actual confinement be alleged, which
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could not be done in the case of a wife or child who had
willingly gone off to live with another person. Hardwicke’s
unpublished views can be found at Add. MSS 35,878, f. 91 et
seq. Mansfield’s unpublished notes are at Scone Palace MSS,
Bundle 1352.
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3.

The Habeas Corpus Act of 1816

At the end of the debate in the House of Lords in
1758, Hardwicke moved that the judges should prepare a bill
“to extend the power of granting writs of Habeas Corpus” to
cases not within the 1679 Act, and to present the bill at the
start of the next session of Parliament.17 This was agreed,
and according to Horace Walpole, the maneuver prevented a
division in the Lords.18 The bill was in fact drafted, but was
never introduced.19
In 1816, however, an act was passed (56 Geo. III, c.
100) that was virtually identical to the judges’ bill. The 1816 Act
applied to non-criminal situations other than imprisonment for debt
or by process in a civil suit, and provided, among other things, that
the writ could issue during vacation on a probable cause showing
by affidavit, and that the truth of the facts alleged in the return
could be examined by a single judge in vacation or by the court in
term time.

II.
IN COLONIAL AND EARLY POST-COLONIAL
AMERICAN LAW, HABEAS CORPUS WAS
GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO REVIEW THE
LEGALITY OF CIVIL CONFINEMENT, WITHOUT
LIMITATION AS TO CITIZENSHIP OR THE
17

15 PARL. HIST. ENG. 925-25.

18

Id. at 925, n.*.

19

The bill is printed in DODSON, supra. In a letter of March 9,
1759, Hardwicke reported to Newcastle that he “understood the
judges had made a draft,” but that, after a little noise about it
some time back, he had heard nothing further. He concluded
that “it did not look as if the friends of the bill were eager for it.”
Add. MSS 32,888, f. 436.
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NATURE OF THE ILLEGALITY ASSERTED
In colonial and post-colonial America, the lawfulness of
Executive Branch confinement was subject to review on petition
for writ of habeas corpus. In adjudicating habeas petitions, state
and federal judges performed the core judicial function of
interpreting statutes and resolving other questions of law. Judges
recognized that the writ was available to contest the legality of
civil confinement, and further that it was available regardless of
the petitioner’s citizenship status. Consistent with the
contemporaneous practice in England described above (supra,
I.A), American judges adjudicated habeas challenges to noncriminal confinement by persons in military custody, held as a
debtor, bonded servant, or slave, and detained as a deserter from a
foreign ship.
As is explained below, the broad scope extended by
American courts to habeas corpus was affirmed in countless
decisions, including opinions by John Marshall, Joseph Story, and
Lemuel Shaw. Had Mr. St. Cyr filed a petition for habeas corpus
in 1789 contending that his Executive Branch custody was
pursuant to the government’s misinterpretation of a statute, there is
substantial evidence that a judge would have decided the merits of
the statutory claim.

A.

Habeas Corpus As Known In England Was
Fully A Part of Early American Law

From the establishment of the American colonies,
habeas corpus was a part of colonial law. See WILLIAM F.
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 98
(1980) (conquest of “infidel” (non-Christian) lands such as
American colonies resulted in extension of the law of
England in force at time of conquest, including common law
and all affirming statutory law, insofar as “was applicable to
colonial life”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 156 (1851)
(observing that in each colonial charter, “either expressly or
by necessary implication it is provided that the laws of
England so far as applicable shall be in force there”); HURD,
supra at 92 (“The American colonists always claimed to
possess ‘all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and
natural-born subjects within the realm of England’”) (citation
omitted). Thus, “the common-law writ of habeas corpus was
in operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled
in 1776.” DUKER, supra, at 115. As detailed in Part I, supra,
that common-law writ was available to review legal
challenges to civil custody.20
There are few reported habeas decisions from the
colonial period. This was true because of the paucity of
printed case reports, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 102-03, 322-26 (2d ed. 1985),
and because “incarceration was not routinely imposed as a
20

While the common law right to habeas corpus applied with full
effect from the establishment of each colony, the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679 did not initially extend there, so its procedural
innovations were at first unavailable. DUKER, supra, at 99 (postconquest enactments by Parliament applied in colonies only by
express direction). Eventually, however, royal governors in
Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia issued
proclamations extending the 1679 Act’s procedural reforms in
those colonies. See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States
- 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 251 (1965); see also A.H.
Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the American Colonies, 8 AM.
HIST. REV. 18, 24-25 (1902); DUKER, supra, at 100, 103-06.
Official extension of the 1679 Act was likely but a formality, for
as Zechariah Chafee surmised, “in actual practice all judges used
its procedure as a matter of course.” Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The
Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L.
REV. 143, 146 (1952).
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means of postconviction punishment for criminal acts until
the nineteenth century,” Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the
Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995). The habeas
decisions that do exist from the colonial era, however,
confirm the writ’s role as the principal recourse of persons
subject to illegal government detention, including noncriminal custody. HURD, supra, at 96-97; DUKER, supra, at
101-02.
B.

In the Post-Colonial Era, Habeas Corpus Was
As Broad and Effective a Remedy As in
England

Judges widely understood the writ to be available to
review the lawfulness of non-criminal confinement in early
America, including statutory questions. See WILLIAM S.
CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 137
(2d ed. 1893); (“[T]he writ . . . may issue in civil as well as in
criminal cases . . . .”); id. at 249 (“The issue raised on the
hearing of a habeas corpus may be one of law simply.”);
HURD, supra, at 146.21
Chief Justice John Marshall and Associate Justice
Joseph Story, riding circuit, each authored important
decisions resolving statutory construction questions on
habeas petitions challenging civil confinement, Marshall in a
21

It is also plain that the writ was available to non-citizens. See,
e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention,
and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 989 (1998)
(“The right to the writ . . . in the United States was . . . not
limited to citizens.”); U.S. v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377, 378-79
(Cir. Ct. D. Pa. 1797) (on habeas, discharging non-citizen
arrested for treason).
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debtor case, see In re Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (Cir. Ct. D.
Va. 1833) (Marshall, C.J., on circuit), Story in a military
enlistment case, see U.S. v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946, 94952 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1816) (Story, J., on circuit) (interpreting
naval enlistment statute), and again in a case involving
deserters from a foreign ship, see Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F.
Cas. 853, 854 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J., on circuit)
(construing federal statute governing naval desertion). See
also C'wealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227 (Mass.
1836) (Shaw, C.J.) (on habeas, construing provision of
federal enlistment statute).
1.

The Founders Enshrined Habeas
Corpus in its Full Width and Effect

The Articles of Confederation were silent as to
habeas corpus, Chafee, supra, at 145, and “when the
constitutional convention met in Philadelphia in 1787 there
were [only] four states with habeas corpus guarantees in their
constitutions.” Oaks, supra, at 247. But see Chafee, supra,
at 146 (absence of habeas provisions in state constitutions
because writ “had been so long and solidly established in
every colony that assertion was probably considered
unnecessary”).
Yet the authors of the U.S. and state constitutions
were careful to preserve the writ of habeas corpus and to
ensure that early U.S. practice continued English and colonial
traditions. At the Constitutional Convention, Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina proposed several versions of a
guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus, and apart from
objection by some that the writ should never be suspended,
the Suspension Clause was adopted with little debate. HURD,
supra, at 107-10; Oaks, supra, at 248-49 (noting that three
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colonies voted against the provision that writ may be
suspended “when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it”); DUKER, supra, at 127-35.
Statutory enactments followed the adoption of habeas
corpus clauses in the federal and state constitutions.
Congress provided for habeas corpus jurisdiction in section
14 of the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82
(1789), which codified the familiar common law writ. The
common law of each original state also provided for habeas
review. The states moved slowly to adopt formal statutory
provisions, Oaks, supra, at 251, and initially all patterned
their statutes on the 1679 English Act. Id. at 252-53. See
also HURD, supra, at 121-28. Like the 1679 Act, the statutes
in five states initially neglected non-criminal confinement,
leaving civil custody subject to challenge under the
traditional common law writ. Oaks, supra. at 254-55.
2.

Post-Colonial Case Law Evidences
The Wide and General Application of
Habeas Corpus To Review Questions
of Law

Reflecting eighteenth century English practice, the writ of
habeas corpus was invoked to challenge the lawfulness of noncriminal confinement in a number of circumstances in the postcolonial period. In their decisions, state and federal judges
regularly performed the traditional function of construing statutes
and resolving other questions of law.

a.

Habeas as a Remedy for Indentured Servants

Habeas was used to challenge private confinement as
an indentured servant, and in these cases judges regularly
adjudicated statutory claims. See, e.g., Respublica v.
Keppele, 2 U.S. 197, 198-99 (Mem.) (Pa. 1793) (construing
Pennsylvania servant statute, concluding infant could not be
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bound, and discharging fourteen year-old who had fled
service); State v. Sheve, 1 N.J.L. (1 Coxe) 230, 230 (N.J.
1794) (granting writ to 27-year old man indentured by
mother, upon application of common-law principle that
“parental authority to dispose of a child’s services ceases
when the latter arrives at the age of twenty-one”); State v.
Taylor, 3 N.J.L. (2 Penning.) 467, 1808 WL 1006, at *1 (N.J.
1808) (Pennington, J., dissenting) (minor must agree to
indenture himself under “the true construction” of state
servitude statute); C'wealth ex rel. Stephenson v. Vanlear, 1
Serg. & Rawle 248, 1815 WL 1221, at *2-3 (Pa. 1814)
(opinion of Tilghman, C.J.) (construing 1799 statute, in part
in contrast to 1790 statute, and holding master’s assignment
of indentured minor to third-party, without consent of
minor’s father, improper under later statute); In re
Goodenough, 19 Wis. 274 (1865) (holding indenture in
violation of state statute requiring that instrument specify
instruction in “profession, trade, or employment”). Church
gives the specific example that where states regulate such
relationships, “[i]ndentures of apprenticeship must conform
to the requirements of the statute,” CHURCH, supra, at 744,
and are subject to review on habeas. Id. at 745.
Judges also adjudicated a related legal claim on
habeas, that a master had unlawfully removed a servant from
the state in which the indenture had been executed. See, e.g.,
C'wealth v. Edwards, 6 Binn. 202 (Pa. 1813) (applying
common law to hold minor bound in Virginia may not be
removed to Pennsylvania, where indenture does not provide
for such removal). See also Davis v. Coburn, 8 Mass. 299,
1811 WL 1678, at *4 (Mass. 1811) (if master could assign
servant from New Hampshire “into Massachusetts, I see not
why he might not have sent him to Georgia, or even to
China. That a master should have such legal authority would
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be monstrous”) (emphasis in original); Gusty v. Diggs, 11 F.
Cas. 128 (Cr. Ct. D.C. 1820) (apprentice bound in Maryland
may not be brought into District of Columbia).
b.

Habeas As Applied in Civil Debtor Cases

Debtors subject to confinement also petitioned for
writs of habeas corpus in the United States, and these
petitions frequently raised questions of law.22 The opinions
22

See, e.g., Kennedy & Co. v. Fairman, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 408
(N.C. 1796) (construing creditor notice provision of insolvency
statute and remanding prisoner); Fitzpatrick v. Neal, 3 N.C. (2
Hayw.) 8 (N.C. 1797) (debtor arrested and imprisoned pursuant
to letter of attorney released because letter not under required
seal); Shorthouse & Ross v. Carothers, 3 Yeates 182 (Pa. 1801)
(releasing debtor who had been re-arrested after posting bond in
same cause); Ex Parte McNeil, 6 Mass. 245 (Mass. 1810)
(discharging debtor as privileged from arrest while attending
court in the “necessary care of his action”); C'wealth v.
Cornman, 4 Binn. 483 (Pa. 1812) (construing provisional
discharge section of 1812 insolvency statute and remanding
prisoner); C'wealth v. Alexander, 6 Binn. 176 (Pa. 1813) (on
habeas, releasing debtor on grounds that warrant was defective);
Attorney Gen. v. Fenton, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 292 (Va. 1816)
(affirming discharge of men confined by court-martial, for
failure to pay fine for not appearing at place of rendezvous for
militia); C'wealth v. Keeper of Jail, 4 Serg. & Rawle 505 (Pa.
1818) (construing 1802 federal statute prohibiting arrest of
soldier for debt and denying writ to detained husband who
deserted family and failed to provide maintenance); Bank of U.S.
v. Jenkins, 18 Johns. 305, 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) (affirming
authority under state habeas statute to review lawfulness of
debtor’s imprisonment); Richards v. Goodson, 4 Va. (2 Va.
Cas.) 381 (Va. 1823) (holding debtor privileged from arrest
while attending court on his own case and discharging prisoner);
C'wealth v. Waite, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 445 (Mass. 1824) (where
debtor arrested upon valid execution, incorrect copy produced in
return to writ, and correct copy provided later, terms of state
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in In re Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (Cir. Ct. D. Va. 1833),
show that judges resolved questions of statutory construction
in habeas challenges to civil confinement of debtors. There,
on a warrant issued by the Treasury under a statute governing
the administration of public accounts, see 3 Stat. 592, 31
U.S.C. §§ 506-508, Randolph was arrested for debt allegedly
outstanding following his naval service. Randolph, 20 F.
Cas. at 242. On habeas, Chief Justice Marshall recited but
avoided several constitutional challenges raised by
Randolph’s counsel, notably that the act impermissibly
conferred judicial power on the executive. Id. at 253-54
(Marshall, C.J., on circuit). He then conducted a detailed
statutory analysis, comparing the text of §§ 2 and 3 of the act,
before construing the sections narrowly as not applying to
Randolph, an “acting” Purser. Id. at 254-57; see also id. at 256
(describing “fair construction” of act); id. at 251-52 (Barbour, D.J.,
on circuit) (construing act as not permitting Treasury to reopen
account previously settled).23

c.

Habeas To Redress Unlawful Military
Enlistment

statute satisfied). See also Discharge of Richardson, Worcester
Sup. Jud. Ct., (Mass. Sept. 1800) (discharging debtors who, as
soldiers, were exempt from imprisonment for debt under federal
statute), cited in William E. Nelson, The American Revolution
and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Federalism and
Conflict of Laws, 62 COLONIAL SOC. OF MASS. 419, 458 n.7
(1984); Oaks, supra, at 265.
23

Judge Barbour also considered “whether habeas corpus could be
sustained in favor of a party imprisoned under civil process,” id.
at 253, in light of Marshall’s cryptic decision in Ex Parte
Watson, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 52 (1810). Barbour reviewed the
common law authorities, however, and concluded that “the writ
is not confined to criminal cases.” Randolph, 20 F. Cas at 253.
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Nineteenth century American courts decided many
habeas petitions challenging the legality of military and
naval enlistments, routinely exercising a broad scope of
review. NELSON, supra, at 457 (“State writs of habeas
corpus . . . were used on numerous occasions to test the
validity of military enlistments . . . Such state writs, of
course, carried with them the power to interpret the federal
statutes by which the validity of the enlistments was
determined”). See generally HURD, supra, at 156.
Many habeas challenges to military enlistments arose
around the time of the War of 1812. In an effort to expand
the nation’s military forces, the federal government paid
bounties to enlistment brokers for each new recruit secured,
leading to a high number of fraudulent enlistments, often of
minors. Arkin, supra, at 14-15. See, e.g., C'wealth v.
Murray, 4 Binn. 487, 487, 492-93 (Pa. 1812) (opinion of
Tilghman, C.J.) (interpreting 1809 statute as permitting naval
enlistment of minor child who “has neither father, master, nor
guardian” and “against the consent” of mother, relying in part
on comparison between 1802 army and 1809 naval
enlistment statutes); Ex parte Mason, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 336,
337 (N.C. 1809) (construing statutory term “parent” as
including mothers as well as fathers); C'wealth v. Cushing,
11 Mass. (11 Tyng) 67, 71 (Mass. 1814) (“The true
construction must be, that persons under the age of twentyone years are not to be enlisted or held in service, unless with
the [required] consent . . . and if they have no parents,
guardians, or masters, they are not to be enlisted or held in
service at all”) (emphasis added); C'wealth ex rel. Menges v.
Camac, 1 Serg. & Rawle 87, 1814 WL 1344, at *2 (Pa. 1814)
(opinion of Tilghman, C.J.) (construing statute as permitting
father to consent days after minor’s formal enlistment).24
24

See also In re Stacy, 10 Johns 328, 333-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813)
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(Kent, C.J.) (discharging civilian accused of treason and
detained by federal military authorities as beyond authority of
tribunal).
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The differing interpretations of the parental consent
provisions reached by the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
courts were addressed in a major opinion by Justice Story on
circuit. United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (Cir. Ct.
D. Mass. 1816), exemplified statutory construction in a
habeas corpus case. Bainbridge was a challenge to a minor’s
enlistment in the U.S. Navy without parental consent. After
concluding that Congress could constitutionally authorize the
enlistment of a minor without parental consent, Justice Story
turned to the specific question of whether Congress actually
had so legislated. Reviewing the language of the naval and
army enlistment acts, and reading the instant statute against
general common-law contract principles, Justice Story
concluded that the naval acts allowed the enlistment of a
minor without his father’s consent. Id. at 951-52.25
25

Habeas challenges to military enlistments led judges to continue
to construe the statutes after the War of 1812. See, e.g., State v.
Brearly, 5 N.J.L. 555, 1819 WL 1256, at *5 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1819)
(consent by master subsequent to enlistment of apprenticed
minor sufficient under statute); State v. Clark, 2 Del. Cas. 578,
580-81 (Del. Ch. 1820) (discharging soldier on evidence that he
was underage and intoxicated at time of enlistment, “knew
nothing of being enlisted until the next morning,” and lacked his
father’s consent, as confinement was “contrary to law”); In re
Carlton, 7 Cow. 471, 471, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1827) (“Any person
illegally detained, has the right to be discharged, and it is the
duty of this court to restore him to his liberty.”); C'wealth v.
Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227, 1836 WL 2527, **3-4 (Mass.
1836) (Shaw, C.J.) (distinguishing Bainbridge and holding
statute does not authorize minor enlisting as seaman in the U.S.
Navy without consent of his legal guardian); Bamfield v. Abbot,
2 F. Cas. 577, 578 (D. Mass. 1847) (discharging minor allegedly
enlisted under 1846 act, where company had “not [yet] been
mustered into the service of the United States, or been received
or accepted by any officer thereof”); C'wealth ex rel. Webster v.
Fox, 7 Pa. 336, 1847 WL 5030, at *2 (Pa. 1847) (prohibition in
the 1802 Act against enlistment of minors without consent of
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father, guardian, or master “is as plain as the English language
can make it”); Sim’s Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285, 309 (1851)
(issuance of writs “is constantly done, in cases of soldiers and
sailors, held by military and naval officers, under enlistments
complained of as illegal and void”); U.S. ex rel. Turner v.
Wright, 28 F. Cas. 798, 798-99 (Cir. Ct. W.D. Pa. 1862)
(construing statute as requiring discharge of minor who enlisted
on false oath); U.S. v. Taylor, 28 F. Cas. 22, 22-23 (D.N.J. 1863)
(statutory language and legislative history indicate that oath of
enlistment taken by the recruit is conclusive as to his age); In re
McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 33, 34-36 (D. Mass. 1866) (engaging in
“[a] careful examination of the acts of congress regulating
enlistments in the army” to determine whether, inter alia,
enlistment of minor without father’s consent was valid).
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Habeas review of legal questions in the enlistment
cases was plainly available to non-citizens. See, e.g.,
C'wealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 63, 65 (Mass. 1814)
(discharging Russian minor enlisted without consent of
parent, guardian, or master, as “[a] foreign minor is included
in the [statutory] prohibition”); Wilson v. Izard, 30 F. Cas.
131, 1815 U.S. App. Lexis 247, at *2 (C.C. D. N.Y. 1815)
(adjudicating claim by British enlistees that they were “alien
enemies” ineligible to serve but remanding); U.S. v. Wyngall,
5 Hill 16, 18, 26, 1843 WL 4481, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843)
(construing statutory authorization to enlist “able bodied
citizen[s] of the United States” as directory, not mandatory
and concluding that non-citizen was lawfully enlisted).
d.

Habeas Relief For Deserters From Foreign
Ships

Seamen who deserted from foreign ships, regardless
of citizenship, were subject to arrest, either at the request of
consular officers pursuant to treaty or under general federal
legislation enacted in 1829. See Neuman, supra, at 990-91.
These arrests occasionally prompted habeas petitions to state
and federal judges, whose decisions resolved questions of
law. See, e.g., C'wealth v. Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle 392
(Pa. 1815) (discharging alleged deserter and holding arrest
not authorized by statute or common law); Case of the
Deserters from the British Frigate L’Africaine, 3 Am. L.J.
132 (reporting 1809 Maryland decision discharging alleged
deserters); Case of Hippolyte Dumas, 2 Am. L.J. 86
(reporting 1807 Pennsylvania decision discharging alleged
deserters); Ex parte Pool, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 276 (1821)
(arrest of deserters by justice of peace exceeded his
authority); In re Pederson, 19 F. Cas. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1851)
(construing treaty as inapplicable to Swedish deserter who
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returned home and was later arrested after emigrating to
U.S.); see also U.S. v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 49
(Mem) (1795) (where district court declined request of
French consul to arrest alleged deserter, Attorney General
sought mandamus from Supreme Court, arguing if arrest was
unlawful prisoner could seek release on habeas corpus);U.S.
v. Desfontes & Gaillard (S.D. Ga. 1830) (on habeas petition
by French Consul to deliver alleged French deserters, holding
sailors properly detained on state criminal charges and
remanding to state custody), reprinted in Eric M. Freedman,
Milestones in Habeas
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Corpus: Part I, 57 ALA. L. REV. 531, 598-99 (2000).
In 1813, Portugese sailors arrested as alleged deserters
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, requiring
Justice Story, on circuit, to interpret provisions of a federal statute.
Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1813)
(Story, J., on circuit) (construing Act of July 20, 1790, 1 Stat. 131,
regulating seamen in merchant service). The court, per Story, was
“of the opinion, that the act for the regulation of seamen
exclusively applies to seamen engaged in the merchants’ service of
the United States.” Id. at 854. Because the Portugese sailors were
engaged by a foreign vessel, Story held their confinement was
authorized by neither statute nor treaty. Id.

e.

Habeas as a Remedy Against Other Forms of
Civil Confinement

Legal questions arose on habeas challenges to noncriminal confinement in several other circumstances. A
number of decisions addressed challenges to confinement by
a justice of the peace or lower court, often resulting in
delineation of the scope of the confining entity’s legal
authority. See, e.g., C'wealth v. Ward, 4 Mass. (Tyng) 497,
497 (1808) (“[t]he justice [of the peace] has wholly
misconceived his authority” and “the commitment was
illegal”); C'wealth v. Morey, 8 Mass. (Tyng) 78 (Mass. 1811)
(same); Hite v. Fitz-Randolph, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 269 (1812)
(on habeas, discharging creditor who had been arrested on
contempt order for trying to collect on judgment subject to
stay, on grounds that “county court [had] no right to make an
order restraining [creditor] from proceeding on his judgment
at law obtained in the superior court of law”); C'wealth ex
rel. Kerr v. Brady, 3 Serg. & Rawle 309 (Pa. 1817) (on
habeas, holding probate court lacked authority to confine
relator on contempt and discharging prisoner); Washburn v.
Belknap, 3 Conn. 502 (1821) (confinement to workhouse for
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indefinite term by justice of peace contrary to statute); State
v. Applegate, 13 S.C.L. (McCord) 110 (1822) (justice of
peace not authorized to confine constable for act of contempt
done outside presence of justice); Ex parte Minor, 17 F.
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Cas. 457 (Cir. Ct. D.C. 1823) (on habeas, discharging debtor
as arrest warrant exceeded authority of justice of peace). See
also McMullen v. Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (Bay) 46 (S.C. 1787)
(arrest for selling certain liquor by municipal “court of
wardens” unauthorized by statute permitting municipality to
regulate liquor).
In some instances, slaves sought writs of habeas
corpus to win their freedom. See, gen. Arkin, supra, at 3341; see also Respublica v. Betsey, 1 U.S. 469 (Mem.) (Pa.
1789) (construing Pennsylvania statute governing abolition
of slavery as requiring discharge where owner failed to
register slave by statutory deadline); State v. Emmons, 2
N.J.L. 6 (1806) (applying 1798 state statute governing
freeing of slaves and holding execution of manumission did
not satisfy statutory requirements); State v. Quick, 2 N.J.L.
393 (1807) (applying New York statute and granting slave’s
petition for freedom); C'wealth ex rel. Lewis v. Holloway, 6
Binn. 213 (Pa. 1814) (construing exception for slaves of
members of Congress to state statute governing abolition of
slavery and remanding); Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas.
493, 496 (Cir. Ct. D. S.C. 1823) (Johnson, J. on circuit)
(declaring local Negro Seaman Act unconstitutional, but
holding federal habeas statute did not reach person in state
custody).
Finally, as in England, persons confined in mental
health institutions occasionally petitioned for release on
habeas. See Oakes, 8 Monthly Law Reporter 122 (Sup. Jud.
Ct. Mass. 1845) (not officially reported), excerpted in Oaks,
supra, at 267.
In short, the history of colonial and early postcolonial habeas practice demonstrates a strong continuity
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with English traditions set forth in Part I, supra. At common
law and pursuant to state and federal statutory enactments,
the writ was plainly available to persons held in non-criminal
confinement as a means to challenge the lawfulness of their
custody. The writ was available to non-citizens. And, most
importantly for the instant case, the rich history of early civil
habeas practice confirms that state and federal judges
regularly decided questions of law, including interpretation
of statutes governing military enlistment, confinement of
debtors, indentured servitude, abolition of slavery and
desertion from foreign ships. These decisions provide
significant support for the proposition that statutory claims,
such as the statutory retroactivity claim asserted by
Respondent Enrico St. Cyr, were subject to review on the
writ of habeas corpus familiar to the Founders.
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